February 26, 2014

TO: Inspector General

FROM: Administrator


I appreciate your analysis and conclusions regarding the closing out of allegations of possible international traffic in arms regulations (ITAR) and foreign national access issues at the Ames Research Center (ARC) in the 2006 to 2009 timeframe.

I found it important that your investigation did not find misconduct, intentional efforts to bypass ITAR restrictions, or any instances of classified information having been improperly shared with foreign nationals. Your findings, however, identified instances of carelessness and poor judgment regarding our ITAR and foreign national access procedures at ARC during this timeframe. I take these findings seriously and have asked Associate Administrator Robert Lightfoot to assess your findings and recommend any potential corrective actions to address the concerns raised in your report.

Your findings are also a strong reminder of the importance of NASA’s ongoing effort to strengthen its foreign national access and export control processes and my personal commitment to continuously reinforce the significance of our security protocols to NASA’s senior leadership and our employees as a whole. As you know, in the last year I directed an internal review of NASA’s foreign national access and export control processes and took several immediate steps that resulted in the direct improvement and strengthened coordination of our processes. These steps included:

- Suspending public access to the NASA Technical Reports Server until any risk of export-controlled documents being made available on this Web site was properly assessed and managed.
- Directing a moratorium on granting any new access to NASA facilities to individuals from specific designated countries and suspending remote computer access by individuals located in those same countries to NASA information technology resources, while Agency officials conducted a review of foreign access and approval processes.
- Continued close coordination with law enforcement agencies on security and counter-intelligence issues.
• Directing a renewed emphasis to Agency supervisors and the workforce on the importance of our security protocols, including assessments of whether new training programs may be needed.

In addition, I commissioned an external independent review of our foreign national access processes, which was recently completed. I have committed to reviewing its recommendations thoroughly and to have them inform changes to our existing processes. This effort will include an assessment of additional resources that may be required for NASA to successfully implement the proposed recommendations. Specifically, I have asked the NASA Assistant Administrator for Protective Services to assess the integration of our foreign national access management processes, with an emphasis on: (1) providing consistent guidance, training, and oversight across all NASA Centers; (2) engaging all stakeholders in the identification of best practices and creation of operational manuals and materials; and (3) incorporating stronger compliance and accountability mechanisms into NASA’s existing reviews. Moreover, in the area of export control, the NASA Associate Administrator for International and Interagency Relations is reviewing options for: (1) enhancing and standardizing our training and education for all Centers; and (2) exploring stronger compliance and accountability mechanisms.

As suggested in your report, NASA will consider this information along with the insights and recommendations provided by prior reviews as we further evaluate and strengthen NASA’s foreign national access and export control processes. I look forward to continuing to work with your office as we do so.

[Signature]

Charles P. Bolden, Jr.