Highlights taken from our Semiannual Report to Congress for the period ending September 30, 2007, include the following:

• An OIG review, “Effective Inspection Program Key to Improving Laboratory Safety at Glenn Research Center,” found that the Glenn laboratory inspection program was not effectively identifying, or following up on, all incidents of noncompliance. Specifically, we identified incidents of noncompliance in each of the 22 laboratories they reviewed. We determined that the Safety, Health, and Environmental Division (SHED) was not inspecting all of the Glenn laboratories because its laboratory universe was not comprehensive; its list contained 192 fewer laboratories than identified by the Glenn Facilities Division. In addition, although Glenn guidance required corrective action plans for safety violations remaining open after 30 days, 87 violations that should have had plans did not, and 9 violations had the potential to cause injury or damage to personnel or equipment. After our review, SHED initiated a comprehensive review of its chemical management and laboratory safety programs and effectively mitigated any immediate health and/or safety threats by issuing stop-work orders. We made four recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the Glenn laboratory inspection program: comprehensively define the laboratory universe; identify all laboratories inspected; monitor the violations database and notify management of past-due violations and corrective action plans; and coordinate a stand-down day, during which laboratory personnel would conduct a safety self-assessment, then use the results to issue violation notices and identify systemic safety issues. Glenn concurred and provided a corrective action plan with planned completion dates.
• In our audit, “NASA Could Improve Controls and Lower the Cost of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act Mobility Program,” we found that NASA’s internal controls for evaluating and approving costs associated with the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) Mobility Program were inadequate to ensure that expenditures of about $20.5 million annually were properly recorded and accounted for. While NASA’s IPA policy provides guidance and procedures on initiating, processing, and approving IPA agreements, it does not provide guidance to ensure that IPA expenditures were supported, reasonable, and allowable. In addition, NASA did not adopt practices used by other Federal agencies to lower IPA Mobility Program costs; specifically, requiring cost-sharing, disallowing indirect costs, and placing a time limit on extended per diem. We concluded that NASA might be able to reduce the cost of the IPA program over the next 3 years by adopting practices used by other Federal agencies. Management concurred with our recommendations to improve NASA’s internal controls for evaluating and approving costs associated with the IPA Mobility Program. In addition, the changes to IPA guidance proposed in response to our recommendation on cost control practices could result in potential monetary benefits of more than $6.9 million over the next 3 years.
• In our audit ”Marshall Space Flight Center’s Approach to Establishing Product Data Management and Mechanical Computer-Aided Design Software Tools as Standard Center-Wide,” OA found that Marshall had assessed three Product Data Management (PDM) products in April 2002. The assessment included an analysis of the technical, integration, and licensing factors for each product and resulted in recommending and selecting Windchill, a Parametric Technology Corporation product, as the primary PDM for Marshall engineering. However, the auditors also found that the July 2005 selection of Parametric Technology Corporation’s Pro/Engineer as the standard Mechanical Computer-Aided Design (MCAD) software for new flight system designs was made without an assessment or risk analysis. In addition, the selection process did not take into account customer and other stakeholder requirements and operational requirements. The auditors found this to be in conflict with established Agency policy requiring a robust assessment and risk analysis of alternatives. Therefore, the auditors recommended that Marshall suspend efforts to establish Parametric Technology Corporation products as standard and allow design engineers to continue to use UniGraphics Solutions, Inc., PDM and MCAD software pending an assessment and risk analysis of the Windchill PDM and Pro/Engineer MCAD software implementation, in accordance with applicable NASA guidance.

Management nonconcurred with the recommendations, stating that the suspension of archiving and migration activities and the continued use of UniGraphics Solutions, Inc., software tools impact schedule and risk. Management also stated that further risk analysis of the Windchill and Pro/Engineer implementation is not required because NPR 715 0.2, “NASA Software Engineering Requirements,” September 27, 2004, and NPR 8000.4, “Risk Management Procedural Requirements,” April 25 , 2002, were not applicable. Although we recognize that a completed technical assessment and risk analysis may result in showing that the selection of Parametric Technology Corporation’s MCAD software as the standard for Marshall is appropriate, we did not consider management’s comments responsive and requested that management reconsider its position and provide additional comments in response to the final memorandum.